The partnered core of a game with side payments
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Partnered Core of a Game without Side Payments
A payoff for a game is partnered if it admits no asymmetric dependencies. We introduce the partnered core of a game without side payments and show that the partnered core of a balanced game is nonempty. The result is a strengthening of Scarf 's Theorem on the nonemptiness of the core of a balanced game without side payments. In addition, it is shown that if there are at most a countable number ...
متن کاملThe Core of a Cooperative Game without Side Payments^)
The core of an M-person game, though used already by von Neumann and Morgenstern [15], was first explicitly defined by Gillies [5]. Gillies's definition is restricted to cooperative games with side payments and unrestrictedly transferable utilities(2), but the basic idea is very simple and natural, and appears in many approaches to game theory. We consider a certain set of "outcomes" to a game,...
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Introduction. In 1960 a set of axioms for cooperative games without side payments was suggested by Aumann and Peleg [l] which provides a neat generalization of the classical von Neumann-Morgenstern «-person theory [S]. In subsequent papers [2], [3], and [4], many results parallel to the classical theory have been proven in this new framework. The purpose of this note is to re-examine the axioms...
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چکیده ندارد.
15 صفحه اولSide Payments in Marketing
John R. Hauser is the Kirin Professor of Marketing, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 38 Memorial Drive, E56-314, Cambridge, MA 02142, (617) 253-2929, (617) 258-7597 fax. Duncan I. Simester is an Associate Professor of Marketing, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 38 Memorial Drive, E56-329, Cambridge, MA 02142. Birger Wernerfelt ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-012-0651-9