The part-time wage penalty: Does bargaining coverage outweigh regional differences in Spain?
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Part-time Wage Penalty: Does Bargaining Coverage Outweigh Regional Differences in Spain?
The use of part-time jobs is steadily increasing in most advanced economies. Previous literature has concluded that part-time workers suffer a wage penalty, but its magnitude varies across studies and countries. The part-time penalty is the otherwise unexplained element of the gap between full-time and part-time hourly earnings. One potential factor accounting for international differences in t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Economic and Labour Relations Review
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1035-3046,1838-2673
DOI: 10.1177/1035304616659984