The Paradigm Shift in the Disciplining of Village Cadres in China: From Mao to Xi

Abstract Village cadres are important agents for the state yet disciplining them has been difficult. There few disciplinary tools that can easily hold to account. Prior 2018, Party discipline did not apply non-Party cadres. Legislation was ambiguous in relation these grassroots and had rely heavily on legal interpretation. The impact of cadre evaluation system village cadres, who considered be public servants payroll, limited. This situation changed since 2018. party-state consolidated institutionalized ways which checked disciplined. Instead relying policy regulation, dominant method 1949, now fully subject rules laws. These changes have accomplished through application three measures. First, secretaries serve concurrently as heads, members committees overlap, thereby making discipline. Second, “public agents” an equal footing with other agents. Finally, a campaign waged by criminal justice apparatus cleaned up administration prepared it upcoming elections new era.