منابع مشابه
The other ex ante moral hazard in health.
It is well-known that pooled insurance coverage can induce people to make inefficiently low investments in self-protective activities. We identify another ex ante moral hazard that runs in the opposite direction. Lower levels of self-protection and the associated chronic conditions and behavioral patterns such as obesity, smoking, and malnutrition increase the incidence of many diseases and con...
متن کاملEquilibrium in competitive insurance markets with ex ante adverse selection and ex post moral hazard
Existence of pure strategy equilibria is studied in health insurance markets that exhibit both ex ante adverse selection of the Rothschild–Stiglitz–Wilson type, and ex post hidden information moral hazard. It is found that ex post moral hazard has two offsetting effects on the existence of equilibrium, and that in general it is difficult to say whether an equilibrium is more or less likely to e...
متن کاملEx ante moral hazard and ex post adverse selection with soft information
We reverse the standard sequence of a complete contracting model: first the agent takes an action, then she alone observes the stochastic outcome and sends a message to the principal. Presuming of the validity of the Revelation Principle, the optimal (direct) mechanism with audit requires a two-part tariff to be offered to the agent, which weakens the ex ante incentives for effort. We then esta...
متن کاملThe Value of Information in a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard and Ex Ante Contracting
We examine a principal-agent model with moral hazard in which, after contracting, the principal receives a signal correlated with the technology. We call this ex ante contracting and examine the value of information both when the principal has private information and when information is public. We show that: (i) the principal prefers private information to no information; (ii) the principal pre...
متن کاملMultiple Losses, Ex-Ante Moral Hazard, and the Non-Optimality of the Standard Insurance Contract
Under certain conditions the optimal insurance policy will offer full coverage above a deductible, as Arrow and others have shown long time ago. Interestingly, the same design of insurance policies applies in case of a single loss and ex-ante moral hazard. However, many insurance policies provide coverage against a variety of losses and the possibilities for the insured to affect the probabilit...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Health Economics
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0167-6296
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2011.09.001