The optimality of public–private partnerships under financial and fiscal constraints

نویسندگان

چکیده

The government may delegate two sequential tasks (e.g., building and operating an infrastructure) to the same or different agents (i.e., partnership vs. contracts). Agents are risk-neutral but face financial constraints, whereas government's contractual capacity be limited by renegotiation-proofness fiscal constraints. By relying on history-dependent incentives, contract corrects moral hazard more effectively than contracts. Thus, it is socially preferred unless bundling deteriorates agent's conditions. Our results shed new light role of firms' conditions in driving cost–benefit analysis public–private partnerships.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

سال: 2023

ISSN: ['1058-6407', '1530-9134']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12520