منابع مشابه
Students’ Attitude and Experiences toward Punishment in the Educational Environments, in the Golestan University of Medical Sciences
Background: The training context forms the existence of humanity. The aim of the punishment in the universities is the decrease of behavior-incidence. This study examined the students’ attitude and experiences toward the punishment in the educational environments, in the Golestan University of Medical Sciences. Methods: This is a qualitative study. The 30 students interviewed with the semi...
متن کاملSubgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders
First we show that for wealth-constrained agents who may commit an act twice the optimal sanctions are the offender’s entire wealth for the first and zero for the second crime. Then we ask the question whether this decreasing sanction scheme is subgame perfect (time consistent), i.e., does a rent-seeking government stick to this sanction scheme after the first crime has occurred. If the benefit...
متن کاملTurning the Lab into Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon The Effect of Punishment on Offenders and Non-Offenders
The most famous element in Bentham’s theory of punishment, the Panopticon Prison, expresses his view of the two purposes of punishment, deterrence and special prevention. We investigate Bentham’s intuition in a public goods lab experiment by manipulating how much information on punishment experienced by others is available to would-be offenders. Compared with the tone that Jeremy Bentham set, o...
متن کاملA Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders
Agents may commit a crime twice. The act is inefficient so that the agents are to be deterred. The agents are wealth constrained so that increasing the fine for the first offense means a reduction in the sanction for the second offense and vice versa. The agents may follow history dependent strategies. The government seeks to minimize the probability of apprehension. The optimal sanction scheme...
متن کاملCost minimizing sequential punishment policies for repeat offenders
This paper concludes that, when offenders are wealth constrained and the government is resource constrained and can commit to a certain policy throughout the whole planning horizon, cost minimizing deterrence is decreasing, rather than increasing, in the number of offenses. By extending the framework, suggested in Emons (2003), to n-periods setting, we prove that for the agents who may commit a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science
سال: 1960
ISSN: 0022-0205
DOI: 10.2307/1140486