The New NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Median Voter Model, and a Robin Hood Rent Redistribution
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem
We provide strong game-theoretic foundations for the median voter theorem in a onedimensional bargaining model based on Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) model of distributive politics. We prove that, as the agents become arbitrarily patient, the set of proposals that can be passed in any subgame perfect equilibrium collapses to the median voter’s ideal point. While we leave the possibility of some d...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Sports Economics
سال: 2001
ISSN: 1527-0025,1552-7794
DOI: 10.1177/152700250100200203