The Nash Solution as a von Neumann–Morgenstern Utility Function on Bargaining Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Nash Bargaining Solution and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
Bargaining theory has a conceptual dichotomy at its core: according to one view, the utilities in the bargaining problem are meaningless numbers (v-N.M utilities), while according to another view they do have concrete meaning (willingness to pay). The former position is assumed by the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, and the latter is assumed by the egalitarian, utilitarian, and equal-loss...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Homo Oeconomicus
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0943-0180,2366-6161
DOI: 10.1007/s41412-020-00095-9