The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria
A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many di¤erent) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously xed number of units. We de ne a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by u...
متن کاملRandom assignment with multi-unit demands
We consider the setting in which agents express preferences over objects, objects are allocated to agents based on the preferences, and there may be more objects than agents. In randomized settings, agents need to reason about their random allocations. The most well-established preference relation to compare random allocations of objects is stochastic dominance (SD). We present two impossibilit...
متن کاملOne-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands: core and competitive equilibrium
We consider an assignment market with one seller who owns several indivisible heterogeneous goods and many buyers each willing to buy up to a given capacity. Our aim is to study the relationship between the core of the game and the set of competitive equilibria. The core is non-empty and it has a lattice structure which contains the allocation in which every buyer gets his marginal contribution...
متن کاملConnecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
Multiple-partners assignment game is the name used by Sotomayor [The multiple partners game, in: M. Majumdar (Ed.), Equilibrium and Dynamics: Essays in Honor of David Gale, The Macmillan Press Ltd., NewYork, 1992; The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game, Int. J. GameTheory 28 (1999) 567–583] to describe the cooperative structure of the many-t...
متن کاملOn cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: Limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We rst establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated mark...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1432-2994,1432-5217
DOI: 10.1007/s00186-012-0395-4