The morals of moral hazard: a contracts approach
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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We study an economy where intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. Our setting is the same as that developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004]. The present note provides a counterexample to the set of necessary conditions for high effort equilibria developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004] and suggests an alternative equilibrium characterization.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Business Ethics: A European Review
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0962-8770
DOI: 10.1111/beer.12121