The midpoint-constrained egalitarian bargaining solution
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
An arbitration game and the egalitarian bargaining solution
We analyze a simple arbitration procedure which is a multi-stage variant of Nash's demand game. In the absence of discounting, all Nash equilibria of the game yield the egalitarian solution in the first stage. The crucial feature of our arbitration procedure is that, in the case of incompatible demands, the game is allowed to continue and the player who demands the higher gain over the disagree...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Social Sciences
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0165-4896
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.07.006