The Maxmin of Recursive Games with Incomplete Information on one Side
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Minmax and Maxmin of Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
For a class of 2-Person 0-sum repeated games with incomplete information, Aumann/Masch. ler 119671 and Stearns [1967] have given a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of v (the value of the infinitely repeated game). Mertens/Zamir [19711 and Mertens [1971/72] have given the formula (and thus proved the existence) of lim Vn, the limit of the values of the n . .+ ~ games with n r...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematics of Operations Research
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0364-765X,1526-5471
DOI: 10.1287/moor.25.1.23.15206