The maximum incentive solutions in bargaining problems
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Ordinal Solutions to Bargaining Problems
A solution to bargaining problems is ordinal when it is covariant with order-preserving transformations of utility. Shapley (1969) has shown that there exists no ordinal, efficient, and symmetric solution to twoplayer bargaining problems, and has constructed such a solution to threeplayer problems. Here, Shapley’s solution is extended in two directions. First, it is shown how to construct an in...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Social Sciences
سال: 1992
ISSN: 0165-4896
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4896(92)90002-m