The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
We consider an auction in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned off to n bidders. The k highest bidders get an object and pay the k + 1st bid. Bidders receive a signal that provides information about the value of the object. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of this auction. We then consider a sequence of auctions Ar with nr bidders and kr objects. We show that...
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We study the rates at which transaction prices aggregate information in common value auctions under the different information structures in Wilson (Rev. Econ. Stud. 44 (1977) 511) and Pesendorfer and Swinkels (Econometrica 65 (1997) 1247). We consider uniform-price auctions in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned to n bidders, where both n and k are allowed to diverge to inf...
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Auctions, normally considered as devices facilitating trade, also provide a way to probe mechanisms governing one's valuation of some good or action. One of the most intriguing phenomena in auction behavior is the winner's curse - the strong tendency of participants to bid more than rational agent theory prescribes, often at a significant loss. The prevailing explanation suggests that humans ha...
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When a seller has information that could help bidders to estimate asset value, a dictum of auction theory has been that all such information should be publicly announced to bidders. The possibility of privately revealing this information to one or more bidders is introduced. Seller in some circumstances may attain higher expected revenue through revealing his information privately. Examples sho...
متن کاملInformation Aggregation in Double Auctions: Rational Expectations and the Winner's Curse
This paper inquires about the ability of double auction institutions to aggregate information in the context of a " common value " information structure that is known to produce the winner's curse in sealed bid environments. While many fundamental features of the economic environment are different from those studied in the context of sealed bids, the pattern of information distributed to the po...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 1997
ISSN: 0012-9682
DOI: 10.2307/2171736