The Limits of Judicial Reforms: How and Why China Failed to Centralize Its Court System

Abstract This article investigates the implementation effects of China's recent reforms to centralize its court system and offers an explanation why such centralization efforts largely failed. Drawing upon in-depth interviews with judicial personnel from four localities, study shows that local courts’ structural dependence same-level party-states is perpetuated or, in some cases, even exacerbated, despite unprecedented reform plans budgetary management system. Further investigation finds that, contrary what existing assessments suggest, failure less a result regional disparities resources than party-state's own reliance on horizontal line power concentration hierarchy, which core feature Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) one-party rule hinders attempts strengthen both autonomy centralization. The thus challenges two extant notions political-legal developments China – CCP regime has substantially centralized judiciary along vertical line, can continue increase manifest under conditions of, serving purpose deepening authoritarianism.