The justification of comprehension-based beliefs

What justifies our beliefs about what other people say (henceforth, comprehension-based beliefs)? According to epistemic inferentialism​, the justification of depends on beliefs, e.g., words speaker uttered or even sounds they produced. non-inferentialism, ​does not depend beliefs. This paper offers a new defense non-inferentialism. First, I discuss three counterexamples non-inferentialism provided recently by Brendan Balcerak Jackson (2019) (“Against perceptual model utterance comprehension”, Philosophical Studies 176:387–405). argue that only one Jackson’s is effective, and it effective against version viz. language comprehension dogmatism. Second, propose an alternative comprehension-process reliabilism, which immune these counterexamples. conclude we should follow in his rejection dogmatism but all way endorsement inferentialism. Comprehension-process reliabilism superior both alternatives.