The Jerusalem Patriarchal Library

Chicks, Hawks, and Patriarchal Institutions:

Cooperation occurs only in the shadow of conflict. Conflict lies at the heart of sexual reproduction.

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Every continuous-time stochastic game with finitely many states and actions has a uniform and limiting-average equilibrium payoff.

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

We study non-zero-sum continuous-time stochastic games, also known as continuous-time Markov games, of fixed duration. We concentrate on Markovian strategies. We show by way of example that equilibria need not exist in Markovian strategies, but they always exist in Markovian publicsignal correlated strategies. To do so, we develop criteria for a strategy profile to be an equilibrium via differe...

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

The classical Bomber problem concerns properties of the optimal allocation policy of arsenal for an airplane equipped with a given number, n, of anti-aircraft missiles, at a distance t > 0 from its destination, which is intercepted by enemy planes appearing according to a homogeneous Poisson process. The goal is to maximize the probability of reaching its destination. The Fighter problem deals ...