The Inconceivable Popularity of Conceivability Arguments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Two Conceivability Arguments Compared
The conclusion of this argument (hereafter ZA) entails the falsity of physicalism because, technical details aside, physicalism is or entails the thesis that every psychological truth is entailed by some physical truth. If it is possible that I have a zombie duplicate however, then it is possible that the physical truths are as they are and some psychological truth is different. Hence 3 entails...
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It is widely believed that platonists face a formidable problem: that of providing an intelligible account of mathematical knowledge. The problem is that we seem unable, if the platonist is right, to have the causal relationships with the objects of mathematics without which knowledge of these objects seems unintelligible. The standard platonist response to this challenge is either to deny that...
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I argue that zombies are inconceivable. More precisely, I argue that the conceivability-intuition that is used to demonstrate their possibility has been misconstrued. Thought experiments alleged to feature zombies founder on the fact that, on the one hand, they must involve ®rst-person imagining, and yet, on the other hand, cannot. Philosophers who take themselves to have imagined zombies have ...
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This Article considers whether infertile taxpayers can deduct their fertility treatment costs as medical expenses under Internal Revenue Code section 213 and whether they should be able to deduct them. Internal Revenue Code section 213 defines medical expenses as "amounts paid-for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Philosophical Quarterly
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0031-8094,1467-9213
DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqw066