The importance of contingently public goods

Public goods have recently received increasing attention by philosophers. In addition to work on the historical origins of notion public (Desmarais-Tremblay, 2017), their relevance thinking particular political theorists (de Jongh, 2022) and justifiability goods, such as arts (Kessler, 2018), there been a number systematic attempts develop normative theory (see e.g., Kallhoff, 2011; Miller, 2004). Asking which state ought provide, how benefits burdens provision be distributed, these contributions can roughly divided into two camps. One group authors has addressed questions within liberalism, remaining committed principle neutrality. By taking individual preferences given, they note that many promise net efficiency gains ask according what principles distributed Claassen, 2013; Cullity, 2008; Murphy & Nagel, 2001). so doing, see themselves complementing existing theories justice, remain mostly silent allocation costs (Miller Taylor, 2018, p. 556). Another moved beyond neutrality, putting forward arguments in favor are at least part independent preferences, potential foster solidarity connect people Ferdman, 2018; 2014; Kohn, 2020). These contend social value remains underappreciated, may justified providing them even if doing does not result reject view is central criterion judge whether good justified. This philosophical interest coincided with broader sense neglect voiced journalists intellectuals, Britain United States (Irvin, 2012; Judt, 2010; Lehrer, Yet, despite recent surge attention, and, more generally, “scholarly literature relatively thin” (Kohn, 2020, 2).1 article aims contribute about three ways. First, highlighting an ambiguity term “public good” used, Section 2 proposes distinguish between inherently cohere economist's definition non-rivalrous non-excludable, contingently though excludable, provided non-exclusionary form. 3 then draws novel objections variety benefit proposed govern goods. generally offered complements distributive justice aim take care alleged blind spot resulting from possibility welfare required for initial conditions justice. engaging principles, operates level ideal theory. It argues because could also club unless further qualified, demand unacceptable transfers wealthy well who object inclusive mode provision. 4 explore addressing injustices. section thus nonideal alternative transfer payments, or universal basic income, injustices economic inequality we reason think it can, times, effective politically feasible. While this true general, several features set apart: times little no cost, require only limited market interference (or none), powerfully express commitment status equality, particularly where stem unequal access important, frequently overlooked used discourse. some non-excludable order qualify, others merely each terminological choice, argues, important keep apart. Accordingly, The later sections draw good, attempting show advance context Many philosophers remained somewhat vague understand For instance, Avigail Ferdman refers she calls “standard understanding” […] material private cannot provide efficiently” (2018, 662). Although insists nonmaterial pp. 662–63), otherwise relies characterization. her account constitute failure; but fail efficiently various reasons specify defining Even explicit definitions put forward, however, tend mutually inconsistent. rift exemplified Jonathan Anomaly (2015) David Miller (2004).2 writes “[g]oods exhibit nonrivalry nonexcludability” (2015, 109, italics original), invoking standard theory, said its consumption one person diminish availability others, infeasible exclude consumption. contrast, “I shall mean made available everyone without charge, enjoy diminishing opportunity same (2004, 127–28). Miller's encompasses Anomaly's broader: charge fulfilled good's inherent non-excludability (think starry sky) deliberate choice free museums England). As result, will classify certain differently, find different pertinent, sensible: while both should sensibly evident, then, risk talking past other, less obvious prefer. fits classificatory scheme employed economists, contrasted (rivalrous, excludable; apples), (non-rivalrous, pay-tv) common-pool non-excludable; fishing stocks). captures market-failure aspect alludes to: since, definition, excluded use incentive possible. Due so-called free-rider problem, markets efficient levels.3 conflating economists call “club goods” goods,” appears give up valuable distinction. him, library qualifies long fact charge. But collections like London Library prove, libraries typically involve failure: perfect price-discrimination feasible, levels. failure limited—because excluded, At time, better ordinary good”. seems neither uncommon, nor unreasonable speak parks goods—but often freely accessible everyone, is, London's Belgrave Square Garden demonstrates, possible restrict those willing (and able) purchase key. Because advanced pick out aspects, preserve both. avoid misunderstandings, need distinct. To achieve this, I propose goods.4 More specifically, define (along lines) (i) (ii) (in Millerian spirit) matter qualifier “as choice” far necessarily form, mere condition fails mark add qualification, his types Moreover, “non-exclusionary form” broadly: form making token yet every easily afford.5 distinction allows us things inability others. close spirit to, identical with, Vaughn Bryan Baltzly (2021) drawn publicized Baltzly, “whose ‘public’ character results policy decision make (otherwise private) universally available” (2021, 376). Anomaly, discussing health measures, characterizes “goods through incentives created government mandates” 2), being primarily means imposes externalities 6). picks society decide offer universal, specific good. unlike restriction extent rivalrous. reason, much provides apples free, become comes discussion below, having narrower, precise “contingently whose promises gains. remainder attempt importance underappreciated. Three points noted outset though. arguably conceived demarcating spectrum than categorical divide: few instead, exclusion costly. Second, public, depends technology change6: if, dystopian future, pay biodomes, clean air turned Finally, just entirely non-rivalrous, non-excludable: go run park availability, crowd clogs pathways occupies all picnic spots, park's value) others—at limit, becomes rivalrous So, non-rivalry interpreted too strictly; pure impure depending degree rivalry—at given consumption, across range Note, moreover, orthogonal other distinctions debate example, (2018) distinguishes nonuniversal former valued whereas latter some. prominently, 2018) essential necessary) discretionary former, latter, justice.7 one) affects essential.8 explained classification based structural properties, namely excludable form; properties evidently determine critical justice.9 advocated here new ones. specifications course combined; universal. An strand operated focused question justice: criteria 2004; 2001)? puts against response question. objection asserts mandate payments privately wealthy. intrinsic disvaluation disvalue Both case goods: case, respective generates problem. subset directly therefore explored below). demands motivated observations esp. 562–64). On hand, Consider rule law. Broadly understood restraint arbitrary power enforcement legal rules procedures, (immaterial) presupposed virtually would point allocating resources, individuals were subject exercise away impose physical harm)? concern assuming initially society, allocated?10 Goods type, itself justice”, called “essential 564) “necessary (Claassen, 2013, 273). labeled “discretionary 273; 564).11 Proponents thought considered all, endorsed procedural criteria.12 John Rawls, stipulated (discretionary) “when satisfy Wicksell's unanimity criterion” (1999, 248), makes legitimate dependent everyone's consent proposal specifying tax schedule (Wicksell, 1958). (Rawls, 2001), Rawls came relax condition, proposing instead simple majority vote.13 (2004), problem approaches thinks legitimacy, surplus ways—and appear (equally) just. light weaknesses accounts, substantive (Miller, They address steps. identify justice; distribution determined our second step, consider stage additional benefits. most principle, requires everyone. highly permissive; self-interested voting, implies met. Two restrictive advanced. Nagel (2001) propose14 cost proportion receives; proportional principle. (2004) equalize receive; equal prompted objections. criticized treating enterprise: insisting benefits, he claims, contradicts idea community foundational member holds stake” 144). vulnerable related objection. strictly adopt toward perspective jealous child. Among siblings, might bite: child chocolate, brother does, insist that, chocolates sweets available, get any. prohibits circumstances harm reveal pathological insistence “equal share,” exposing lack generosity expected fellow citizens. addition, Taylor 568) argued incomplete. If distinct sets proportionality requirement, tell choose.15 Assuming maximize avoids regards: equalized, provided, it. 569), render leveling-down (though schemes help problem).16 Contingently motivate additional, fundamental objections, apply simultaneously. exclusionary, resources goods; implausible individually illustrated reference swimming pool. A pool fee, (impure) We swimmers suppose swimmer benefit: fitness offers access, claims gain nothing holds, must nothing, imply owed compensation. Of course, exact specification case. sole motivation purchasing membership was cancel once built captured money saved membership. escape accounting. had required, able secure privately, count entire taken lacked access. But, argue, just, fine: escapes accounting, already obtained good—so, maintains increase advantage. Next, variation Suppose well-off decides pool, derive any mandates compensatory payment swimmer, building pool.17 similarly justifies compensation disbenefits swimmer. built, members leave club, prompting fee hike. maintain membership, example sufficiently values disbenefit her. negative contribution implications puzzling. grant obtain unaffordable perhaps accept prefer do seem plausible assign carry really fund consume equivalent worse off? Now, cautious here. judgment reasonably claim ultimately rest intuitions (as relevant cases, underpins extends). Since argument proceeds ensure led astray cases. Perhaps, worry, deem simply because, world inhabit, absurd compensate correct receive benefit, disbenefit, goods? my view, under circumstances, plausible. difference cases exempt contributing deserve coordinating market, privately—in corresponding contribution, compensated. outcome first type case—no goods—aligns outcome, case—compensation goods—diverges outcome. hypothetical good: differ participants. divergence market-based indicates harder justify non-contribution, especially relative rather indirect (due costlier goods). state's involvement quite minimal—the mechanism chip collectively admitting effectively allow off leverage advantage settlements shoulder just—and attained greater always treat equally, soon gets involved indeed owed. concern: baseline treatment ensured? concern, helpful summarize insight Claassen (2013). disadvantages conception life heavily (2013, 278–81). economy, notes, disadvantage goods—few provided. preserved, introduce equally provision: now off, positions unchanged. casts doubt benchmark economy. benchmark, grounds. shows economy starting point, wealthier accounting—namely managed serve substitutes. ben