منابع مشابه
Biased Beliefs and Imperfect Information
Biased Beliefs and Imperfect Information We perform an incentivized experiment designed to assess the accuracy of beliefs about characteristics and decisions. Subjects are asked to declare some specific choices and characteristics with different levels of observability from an external point of view, and typically formed through real world experiences. From the less observable mobile phone purc...
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Let (xn)n be a process with values in a finite set X and law P , and let yn = f(xn) be a function of the process. At stage n, pn = P (xn | x1, . . . ,xn−1), element of Π = ∆(X), is the belief of a perfect observer of the process on its realization at stage n. A statistician observing y1, . . . ,yn’s holds a belief en = P (pn | x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ ∆(Π) on the possible predictions of the perfect obs...
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We study voting models on graphs. In the beginning, the vertices of a given graph have some initial opinion. Over time, the opinions on the vertices change by interactions between graph neighbours. Under suitable conditions the system evolves to a state in which all vertices have the same opinion. In this work, we consider a new model of voting, called the Linear Voting Model. This model can be...
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We develop a dynamic principal–agent model to show how imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs, asymmetric risk attitudes, complementary actions by both parties, and inter-temporal adverse selection arising from the agent’s unobservable actions interact to affect optimal dynamic contracts. Our continuous-time formulation of the model, which features both “hidden actions” and “hidden...
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We study the consequences of positive correlation of beliefs in the design of voting rules in a model with an arbitrary number of voters. We propose a notion of positive correlation, based on the likelihood of agreement of the k best alternatives (for any k) of two orders called TS correlation. We characterize the set of Ordinally Bayesian Incentive-Compatible (OBIC) (d’Aspremont and Peleg (198...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2431447