The Illiquidity of Corporate Bonds

Information Acquisition and Corporate Debt Illiquidity∗

Models based on asymmetric information predict that debt is least sensitive to private information and cannot explain the illiquidity of corporate debt in secondary markets. We analyze security design with moral hazard and offer a new explanation. First, the optimal compensation contract creates incentives for the manager to engage in risk-shifting, making her interests congruent with those of ...

Notes on Bonds: Illiquidity Feedback During the Financial Crisis*

We trace the evolution of extreme illiquidity discounts among Treasury securities during the financial crisis, when bonds fell more than six percent below more-liquid but otherwise identical notes. Using high-resolution data on market quality and trader identities and characteristics, we find that the discounts amplify through feedback loops, where cheaper, less-liquid securities flow to invest...

Factors Affecting the Valuation of Corporate Bonds

On the Valuation of Corporate Bonds

Euro Corporate Bonds Risk Factors ∗

This paper investigates the determinants of credit spread changes on bonds denominated in Euro. The analysis is carried out using a panel data on Euro bonds. We try to asses the relative importance of market and idiosyncratic factors in explaining the movements in credit spread. Because credit spread changes can be easily viewed as an excess return of corporate bonds over treasury, we adopt a f...