The extended mind argument against phenomenal intentionality

Abstract This paper offers a novel argument against the phenomenal intentionality thesis (or PIT for short). The argument, which I'll call extended mind intentionality, is centered around two claims: first asserts that some source intentional states extend into environment, while second maintains no conscious environment. If these claims are correct, then false, implies extension of predicated upon consciousness. important because it undermines an increasingly prominent account nature intentionality. has entered philosophical mainstream and now serious contender to naturalistic views like tracking theory functional role (Loar 1987, 2003; Searle 1990; Strawson 1994; Horgan Tienson 2002; Pitt 2004; Farkas 2008; Kriegel 2013; Montague 2016; Bordini 2017; Forrest Mendelovici 2018). challenges popular sentiment consciousness grounds