The Evolution of Egalitarian Sociolinguistic Conventions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Evolution of Egalitarian Sociolinguistic Conventions
Half a century ago, two works laid the foundation for modern sociolinguistics. Lewis (1969) studied a speech community using a system of symbols and grammatical rules and coordinating on the mapping from symbols to states of the world in order to communicate effectively. Economists and others built on Lewis’ work to erect the modern theory of conventions, their persistence and occasional transf...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171089