The epistemic role of consciousness

The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (Smithies 2019) develops a theory epistemic justification that gives fundamental role to phenomenal consciousness. book works from the bottom up build this epistemological foundational assumptions in philosophy mind. This précis reverses order presentation: it top down put motivations for foreground. aims advance debate between internalism and externalism epistemology. I generally avoid terminology, since there are too many ways drawing divide, but mine is an internalist every sense term. argue accessibilism: version evidentialism combines conception evidence with higher-order accessibility constraint on evidential support relation. Here present as 12-step program addicts. Step 1 evidentialism: thesis you have believe whatever your total supports (6.1). extremely flexible framework building justification, leaves open nature support. It not indispensable theory, provides most powerful developing it. 2 probabilism: relation kind probability (7.2.1). just mathematical convenience model degrees way respects formal principles logic theory. reflects insight hypotheses entails or makes probable. Probabilism raises familiar concerns about idealization, resources addressing them 2015). probabilistic common ground all sides internalism/externalism debate. 3 probabilities (7.1). What themselves? guaranteed by axioms calculus alone, grounds probabilities: necessarily, if it's evidentially probable p degree n, then certain n. underpins JJ Principle: only p. don't question whether A second argument belief constrained aim knowledge: what you're position know. third stable under justified reflection: cannot something abandon upon reflection (8.1-8.2, 9.5). 5 defend accessibilism against objections (5.2, 8.4-8.6, 10.1-10.4, 11.2-11.5). Accessibilism requires relations self-evident they always make themselves (7.2). Defending answering objection can misleading is. respond arguing we using very same need probabilism. key point limitations doxastic capacity evidence. 6 motivate idealized (10.6, 11.6). Why should care ideal respecting extends so far beyond our limited capacities? normative implicit ordinary understanding good reasoning. Enkratic agents who violate logical omniscience thereby committed fallacious Similarly, enkratic disrespecting their own Since rationality evidence, while also requiring enkrasia, 7 (7.2.2). If true, must be which facts included like itself evident way? consists contingent facts, hard see how self-evident, certain. Or they? 8 exception introspection (5.1). simple says some mental states fact state M M. Once again, appeals akrasia (5.3). p, uncertain M, might believing disbelieving doubting You akrasia. So, 9 answer scope (5.4-5.5). Which self-evident? There no reason suppose applies provide Indeed, universal claim manifestly false, subdoxastic representations evident. current when individuated either character dispositions. These phenomenally candidates self-evidence. 10 top-down exhausted (6.4). motivated constraint, together 11 give bottom-up appealing intuitive counterexamples reliabilism, including clairvoyance new evil demon (3.1-3.4, 6.3). try improve these standard arguments objections, distinctive spin exploring parallels blindsight significance 12 show intuitions cases explained vindicated locating within more general (7.3-7.4). They gut reactions. purely intuition-driven approach epistemology dialectically ineffective theoretically unsatisfying. Phenomenal explicitly designed explain why well theoretical Internalist theories tend strong conviction weak principle. One conservatism, promises terms single principle seems balance true (12.1-12.2). But plausible perception, severely distorts memory, introspection, inference, (12.3-12.4). My hope will taken seriously alternative conservatism anyone interested assessing prospects intuitively compelling, principled.