The Effective Use of Limited Information: Do Bid Maximums Reduce Procurement Cost in Asymmetric Auctions?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Effective Use of Limited Information: Do Bid Maximums Reduce Procurement Cost in Asymmetric Auctions?
Conservation programs faced with limited budgets often use a competitive enrollment mechanism. Goals of enrollment might include minimizing program expenditures, encouraging broad participation, and inducing adoption of enhanced environmental practices. We use experimental methods to evaluate an auction mechanism that incorporates bid maximums and quality adjustments. We examine this mechanism’...
متن کاملFavoritism in Asymmetric Procurement Auctions
I examine the economic costs and benefits of granting a right of first refusal to one of two bidders in a procurement auction. This right permits the favored bidder to win a contract by matching the bid of the competing bidder. Such a right, is often observed in business interactions, especially procurement. It is commonly thought that the right of first refusal lowers the payoff to the auction...
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In a procurement context, it can be quite costly for a buyer when the winning seller underestimates the cost of a project and then defaults on the project midway through completion. The Average Bid Auction is one mechanism intended to help address this problem. This format involves awarding the contract to the bidder who has bid closest to the average of the bids submitted. We compare the perfo...
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Consider a marketplace operated by a buyer who wishes to procure large quantities of several heterogeneous products. Suppliers submit price curves for each of the commodities indicating the price charged as a function of the supplied quantity. The total amount paid to a supplier is the sum of the prices charged for the individual commodities. It is also assumed that the submitted supply curves ...
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We use data from highway procurement auctions subject to California’s Small Business Preference program to study the effect of bid preferences on auction outcomes. Our analysis is based on an estimated model of firms’ bidding and participation decisions, which allows us to evaluate the effects of current and alternative policy designs. We show that incorporating participation responses signific...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1068-2805,2372-2614
DOI: 10.1017/s1068280500007309