The Economics of Labor Coercion

The Economics of Labor Coercion

The majority of labor transactions throughout much of history and a significant fraction of such transactions in many developing countries today are “coercive,” in the sense that force or the threat of force plays a central role in convincing workers to accept employment or its terms. We propose a tractable principal-agent model of coercion, based on the idea that coercive activities by employe...

The Economics of Labor

The majority of labor transactions throughout much of history and a significant fraction of such transactions in many developing countries today are "coercive," in the sense that force or the threat of force plays a central role in convincing workers to accept employment or its terms. We propose a tractable principal-agent mode! of coercion, based on the idea that coercive activities by employe...

The economics of child labor.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive o...

Essays in Labor Economics

Title of dissertation: ESSAYS IN LABOR ECONOMICS Ye Zhang, Doctor of Philosophy, 2007 Dissertation directed by: Professor Jeffrey Smith, Economics Professor Judith Hellerstein, Department of Economics My dissertation is composed of two essays in Labor Economics. The first chapter examines how employers learn about workers’ unobserved productivity when learning is asymmetric between incumbent an...

Lectures in Labor Economics