منابع مشابه
A note on the dynamics of incentive contracts
La ont and Tirole [3] show that when the uncertainty about the agent's ability is small, the equilibrium must involve a large amount of pooling, but it is not necessary to be a partition equilibrium. They construct a nonpartition continuation equilibrium for a given rst-period menu of contracts and conjecture that this continuation equilibrium need not be suboptimal for the whole game under sma...
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In a string of seminal contributions Laffont and Tirole (1986, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1993) lay the foundations for the way that modern economic theory looks at regulation and procurement. Starting with a static model they show how agency schemes are used to regulate firms on the basis of the data that becomes available in the course of the operation of the firm (i.e., costs). They demonstrate that ...
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A so-called "incentive contract" is a linear payment schedule, where the buyer pays a fixed fee plus some proportion of audited project cost. That remaining proportion of project cost borne by the seller is called the "sharing ratio." A higher sharing ratio creates more incentive to reduce costs. But it also makes the agent bear more cost uncertainty, requiring as compensation a greater fixed f...
متن کاملRobust Incentive Contracts
We look at a principal–agent model in which the agent has to perform an action, the difficulty of which is better known ex interim than ex ante. We compare two contracting regimes; one with commitment to an ex ante negotiated contract, and one with an ex interim negotiated contract. The ex ante contract can not be too steep, but attempts to negotiate a steeper ex interim contract may result in ...
متن کاملIncentive contracts and unemployment
We study a labour market in which ...rms can observe workers’ output but not their e¤ort, and in which a worker’s productivity in a given ...rm depends on a worker-...rm speci...c component, unobservable for the ...rm. Firms o¤er wage contracts that optimally trade o¤ effort and wage costs. As a result, employed workers enjoy rents, which in turn create unemployment. We show that the incentive ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 1988
ISSN: 0012-9682
DOI: 10.2307/1911362