The Determinants of Capital Structure: Capital Market-Oriented versus Bank-Oriented Institutions
نویسندگان
چکیده
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0022-1090,1756-6916
DOI: 10.1017/s0022109000002751