The Design of Corporate Debt Structure and Bankruptcy
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Design of Corporate Debt Structure and Bankruptcy
This paper integrates the problem of designing corporate bankruptcy rules into a theory of optimal debt structure. We show that, in an optimal contracting framework with imperfect renegotiation, having multiple creditors increases a firm’s debt capacity while increasing its incentives to default strategically. The optimal debt contract gives creditors claims that are jointly inconsistent in cas...
متن کاملThe Design of Corporate Debt Structure and Bankruptcy∗
This paper integrates the problem of designing corporate bankruptcy rules into a theory of optimal debt structure. We show that, in an optimal contracting framework with imperfect renegotiation, having multiple creditors increases a firm’s debt capacity while increasing its incentives to default strategically. The optimal debt contract gives creditors claims that are jointly inconsistent in cas...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Financial Studies
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0893-9454,1465-7368
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhq019