The Debates on Scientific Realism
نویسندگان
چکیده
The debate on scientific realism results from a tension between the empiricist methodology, which is defining feature of science, and claims to effect that science can unveil fundamental nature reality. What distinguishes realist anti-realist positions not necessarily former take knowledge “at face value” or side scientists in general while latter do not. Rather, realists anti-realists propose different ways interpreting as whole, particular its aim (axiological realism), possible achievements (epistemic realism) content (semantic realism). this book defend an interpretation potentially applies each these three levels: modal empiricism. This position purports be articulation pragmatist stance towards science. introductory chapter briefly presents position, then outlines structure book.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Synthese Library
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0166-6991', '2542-8292']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72349-1_1