The Core of a Partition Function Game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Core of a Partition Function Game
We consider partition function games and introduce new definitions of the core that include the effects of externalities. We assume that all players behave rationally and that all stable outcomes arising are consistent with the appropriate generalised concept of the core. The result is a recursive definition of the core where residual subgames are considered as games with fewer players and with...
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In partition function form games, the recursive core (r-core) is implemented by a modified version of Perry and Reny’s (1994) non-cooperative game. Specifically, every stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SSPNE) outcome is an r-core outcome. With the additional assumption of total r-balancedness, every r-core outcome is an SSPNE outcome.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2001
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.257769