The Contours of Locke’s General Substance Dualism

Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism

ions from the overall psychology of a person. Thus, for instance, the notion of a will without an intellect, or of a language module in the absence of belief and desire, is just plain nonsense. Finally, it will not do to speak of the self ’s psychological states and processes themselves—its beliefs, intentions, experiences, and so forth—as being ‘parts,’ much less as being substantial parts, of...

Substance Dualism or Eliminativism

Physicalism (P) entails minimal physicalism (MP), MP entails minimal supervenience (MS), and MS is the thesis that there is covariance between the supervenient and the subvenient stuff. Therefore, if the (alleged) supervenient and subvenient stuff do not covary, then MS is false, and if MS is false then MP is false, and if MP is false then P is false. Put differently: if MS is false then P is f...

Consciousness and the Prospects for Substance Dualism

There has in recent years been a significant surge of interest in non-materialist accounts of the mind. Property dualists hold that all substances (concrete particulars that persist over time) are material, but mental properties are distinct from physical properties. Substance dualists maintain that the mind or person is a non-material substance. This article considers the prospects for substan...

From Mental/Physical Identity to Substance Dualism

Interactionist Substance-Dualism and Parapsychological Phenomena