The compromise value for NTU-games

The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games

The MC-value is introduced as a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic NTU-games. The MC-value is based on marginal vectors, which aze extensions of the well-known marginal vectors for TU-games and hyperplane games. As a result of the definition it follows that the MC-value coincides with the Shapley value for TU-games and with the consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games. It is ...

A Value for Cephoidal NTU-Games

The NTU-Value of Stochastic Games

The Chi-compromise value for non-transferable utility games

We introduce a compromise value for non-transferable utility games: the Chi-compromise value. It is closely related to the Compromise value introduced by Borm, Keiding, McLean, Oortwijn, and Tijs (1992), to the MC-value introduced by Otten, Borm, Peleg, and Tijs (1998), and to the -value introduced by Berganti~ nos, CasasM endez, and V azquez-Brage (2000). The main di erence being that the maxi...

Fractional Solutions for NTU-Games

In this paper we survey some applications of Scarf’s Lemma. First, we introduce the notion of fractional core for NTU-games, which is always nonempty by the Lemma. Stable allocation is a general solution concept for games where both the players and their possible cooperations can have capacities. We show that the problem of finding a stable allocation, given a finitely generated NTU-game with c...