The colored-brain thesis

The “colored-brain thesis”, or strong qualitative physicalism, is discussed from historical and philosophical perspectives. This thesis was proposed by Thomas Case (1888), in a non-materialistic context, close to views explored H. Price (1932) E. Boring (1933). Using Mary’s room thought experiment, one can argue that physicalism implies physicalism. Qualitative involves three basic statements: (i) perceptual internalism, realism of qualia; (ii) ontic charaterized as description space, time, scale; (iii) mind-brain identity thesis. In addition, (iv) structuralism physics, distinguishing the present version suggested Feigl S. Pepper, (v) physical description. “neurosurgeon argument” presented, why greenness visually perceived avocado, which (according this view) brain physical-chemical attribute, would not be seen green neurosurgeon who opens observer’s skull. conception compared with two views, Russellian (and Schlickian) monisms panprotopsychism (including panqualityism). According presented here, phenomenal experience quale q identical physico-chemical quality q, arises combination (1) materiality wassociated brain, (2) causal organization structure relevant elements S, including self: (Sw)q. “explanatory gap” between mental states shifted gap qualities organized specific region (Sw)q, being bridged only set non-explanatory postulates. Keywords: Colored-brain thesis, qualia, panprotopsychism, sensorium.