The Coalitional Rationality of the Shapley Value
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On the Coalitional Rationality of the Shapley Value and Other Efficient Values of Cooperative TU Games
In the theory of cooperative transferable utilities games, (TU games), the Efficient Values, that is those which show how the win of the grand coalition is shared by the players, may not be a good solution to give a fair outcome to each player. In an earlier work of the author, the Inverse Problem has been stated and explicitely solved for the Shapley Value and for the Least Square Values. In t...
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Coalitional games allow subsets (coalitions) of players to cooperate to receive a collective payoff. This payoff is then distributed “fairly” among the members of that coalition according to some division scheme. Various solution concepts have been proposed as reasonable schemes for generating fair allocations. The Shapley value is one classic solution concept: player i’s share is precisely equ...
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15 صفحه اولCOALITIONAL GAME WITH FUZZY PAYOFFS AND CREDIBILISTIC SHAPLEY VALUE
Coalitional game deals with situations that involve cooperations among players, and there are different solution concepts such as the core,the Shapley value and the kernel. In many situations, there is no way to predict the payoff functions except for the expert experiencesand subjective intuitions, which leads to the coalitional game with fuzzy payoffs. Within the framework of credibility theo...
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The Shapley value assigns, to each game that is adequately represented by its characteristic function, an outcome for each player. An elaboration on the Shapley value that assigns, to characteristic function games, a partition functionoutcome is broadly established and accepted, but elaborations to encompass games with externalities (represented by partition functions) are not. Here, I show t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications
سال: 1998
ISSN: 0022-247X
DOI: 10.1006/jmaa.1997.5854