The Chi-compromise value for non-transferable utility games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Chi-compromise value for non-transferable utility games
We introduce a compromise value for non-transferable utility games: the Chi-compromise value. It is closely related to the Compromise value introduced by Borm, Keiding, McLean, Oortwijn, and Tijs (1992), to the MC-value introduced by Otten, Borm, Peleg, and Tijs (1998), and to the -value introduced by Berganti~ nos, CasasM endez, and V azquez-Brage (2000). The main di erence being that the maxi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (ZOR)
سال: 2002
ISSN: 1432-2994,1432-5217
DOI: 10.1007/s001860200193