The Case for Limited Liability Eurozone Government Debt
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Credit Markets, Limited Commitment, and Government Debt
A dynamic model with credit under limited commitment is constructed, in which limited memory can weaken the effects of punishment for default. This creates an endogenous role for government debt in credit markets. Default can occur in equilibrium, and government debt essentially plays a role as collateral and thus improves borrowers’ incentives. The optimal provision of government debt acts to ...
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A dynamic model with credit under limited commitment is constructed, in which limited memory can weaken the effects of punishment for default. This creates an endogenous role for government debt in credit markets, and the economy can be non-Ricardian. Default can occur in equilibrium, and government debt essentially plays a role as collateral and thus improves borrowers’ incentives. The provisi...
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This paper surveys the literature on the macroeconomic effects of government debt. It begins by discussing the data on debt and deficits, including the historical time series, measurement issues, and projections of future fiscal policy. The paper then presents the conventional theory of government debt, which emphasizes aggregate demand in the short run and crowding out in the long run. It next...
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The relationship between government debt, exports and economic growth has been the focus of a considerable number of academic studies in recent years. The economic crisis, which started in the United States mortgage market, quickly went global when mortgage-backed securities traded by financial institutions. Europe’s response was immediate regarding the measures to tackle the crisis. The establ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1689695