The big carrot: High-stakes incentives revisited
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited
The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited This paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estima...
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It is commonly perceived that increasing incentives improves performance. However, the reaction to increased incentives might differ between men and women, leading to gender differences in performance. In a natural experiment, we study the gender difference in performance resulting from changes in stakes. We use detailed information on the performance of high-school students and exploit the var...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0894-3257,1099-0771
DOI: 10.1002/bdm.657