The bargaining set and coalition formation
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study solution concepts for nontransferable utility games according to which the coalition structure and payoff allocations are simultaneously determined. The steady bargaining set is a refinement of Zhou set, included in Mas-Colell set. prove nonemptiness partial efficiency at least one under restrictive non-crossing condition. Without this condition, may be empty nonempty but not efficient.
منابع مشابه
Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation
1 This is a revised version of the first chapter of my dissertation and I stand in great debt to my dissertation supervisor Andrew Postlewaite, Stephen Coate, and Stephen Morris for comments, suggestions, encouragement, and patience. Two referees and an associate editor provided detailed comments and criticism that led to significant improvements of the paper. I also thank George Mailath, Andre...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1742-7363', '1742-7355']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12320