The axiomatic characterizations of majority voting and scoring rules
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Axiomatic Characterizations of Majority Voting and Scoring Rules
résumé – Les caractérisations axiomatiques du vote majoritaire et des classements par points. Le cadre arrowien de la théorie des choix collectifs est suffisament flexible pour entreprendre une étude axiomatique précise des règles de vote qui sont communément utilisées dans des élections politiques, lors de compétitions sportives ou par des comités d’experts etc. comme le vote à la majorité ou ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathématiques et sciences humaines
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0987-6936,1950-6821
DOI: 10.4000/msh.2919