The asymptotic plurality rule for molecular sequences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Characterization of the Plurality Rule
We consider an axiomatic characterization of the plurality rule, which selects the alternative(s) most preferred by the largest number of individuals. We strengthen the characterization result of Yeh (Economic Theory 34: 575–583, 2008) by replacing efficiency axiom by the weaker axiom called faithfulness. Formally, we show that the plurality rule is the only rule satisfying anonymity, neutralit...
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This note characterizes the ‘inverse plurality rule’, where voters specify only their least preferred alternative. This rule is characterized by a new minimal veto condition (MV) and the four well known conditions that characterize scoring rules; namely, Anonymity (A), Neutrality (N), Reinforcement (RE) and Continuity (C). Our new characterization result is related to the characterizations of a...
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Conventional models of single district plurality elections show that with three parties anything can happen extreme policies can win regardless of voter preferences. I show that when there are multiple district elections for a legislature we get back to a world where the median voter matters: an extreme policy will generally only come about if it is preferred by the median voter in a majority o...
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The study of general election outcomes can be helped by finding better approaches for visualizing large quantities of information and asking questions about its patterning. We review the Nagayama or ‘all possibilities’ triangle display, and show that it can only legitimately be used to show an overall ‘field’ of results that is logically feasible, called the effective space of competition, whic...
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We consider a collective choice problem in which the number of alternatives and the number of voters may vary. The two fundamental axioms in such a setting are reinforcement and composition-consistency. The former guarantees that the social choice rule cannot be manipulated by partitioning the electorate into sub-electorates. The latter guarantees that the rule cannot be manipulated by altering...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical and Computer Modelling
سال: 1996
ISSN: 0895-7177
DOI: 10.1016/0895-7177(95)00231-6