The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation
One of the central concerns about American policy-making institutions is the degree to which political outcomes can be influenced by interested parties. While the literature on interest group strategies in particular institutions– legislative, administrative, and legal–is extensive, there is very little scholarship which examines how the interdependencies between institutions affects the strate...
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This paper describes how wealth inequality may distort public resource allocation. A government seeks to allocate limited resources to productive sectors, but sectoral productivity is privately known by agents with vested interests in those sectors. They lobby the government for preferential treatment. The government—even if it honestly seeks to maximize economic efficiency—may be confounded by...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Business and Politics
سال: 2002
ISSN: 1369-5258,1469-3569
DOI: 10.1080/1369525022000015603