The all-pay auction with complete information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Best-Shot All-Pay (Group) Auction with Complete Information∗
We analyze an all-pay group contest problem in which individual members’ efforts are aggregated via the best-shot technology and the prize is a public good for the winning group. The interplay of within-group free-riding and across-group competition allows for a wide variety of equilibria, according to how well groups are able to overcome internal free-riding. In a symmetric model we derive equ...
متن کاملThe All-Pay Auction with Complete Information and Identity-Dependent Externalities
We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibria with only two active players in the all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities. This condition shows that the generic equilibrium of the standard all-pay auction is robust to the introduction of "small" identity-dependent externalities. In general, however, the presence of identity...
متن کاملThe All-Pay Auction with Complete Information and Identity-Dependent ExternalitiesI
We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibria with only two active players in the all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities. This condition shows that the generic equilibrium of the standard all-pay auction is robust to the introduction of "small" identity-dependent externalities. In general, however, the presence of identity...
متن کاملReserve prices in all-pay auctions with complete information
We introduce reserve prices in the literature concerning all-pay auctions with complete information, and reconsider the case for the so-called Exclusion Principle (namely, the fact that the seller may find it in her best interest to exclude the bidders with the largest willingness to pay for the prize). We show that a version of it extends to our setting. However, we also show that the Exclusio...
متن کاملThe All-pay Auction with Independent Private Values
In the independent private values setting, we provide sufficient conditions for the continuity and uniqueness of the allpay auction equilibrium. We also provide an algorithm to compute the equilibrium. Preliminary and incomplete. Please, do not cite or quote without permission.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 1996
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/bf01211819