Testing Leniency Programs Experimentally: The Impact of 'Natural' Framing
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Impact of Leniency Programs on Cartels
Antitrust authorities have set up leniency programs for firms that denounce collusive agreements in which they have participated. These programs, by inducing reports on collusive agreements, allow to fine participants and can thereby eventually deter collusion. We analyze the impact of reduced fines and positive rewards on the behavior of firms. We propose the use of whistle-blowing mechanisms,...
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Antitrust authorities have set up leniency programs for cartel members that denounce their collusive agreements. These programs help prosecute participants and can thereby deter collusion. We compare the impact of reduced fines and positive rewards and argue that rewarding individuals, including firm employees, can deter collusion in a more effective way. We discuss possible adverse effects of ...
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This study characterizes the corporate leniency policy that minimizes the frequency with which collusion occurs. Though it can be optimal to provide only partial leniency, plausible sufficient conditions are provided whereby the antitrust authority should waive all penalties for the first firm to come forward. It is also shown that restrictions should be placed on when amnesty is awarded, thoug...
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Leniency programs contribute to destabilizing collusion, however offering generous leniency might risk being exploited to perverse effects. This paper develops a simple model to resolve this trade-off in the design of leniency programs, which allows us to relate the optimal leniency policies to the frequency and effectiveness of investigations. We show that it is always desirable to offer some ...
متن کاملLeniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution
We study the enforcement of competition policy against collusion under Leniency Programs, which give reduced ̄nes to ̄rms revealing information to the Antitrust Authority. Such programs give ̄rms an incentive to break collusion, but may also have a pro-collusive e®ect, since they decrease the expected cost of misbehaviour. We analyze the optimal policy under alternative rules and with homogeneo...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1483795