Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Optimal Striking Rules
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of Counterterrorism
In America, Britain and Australia the threat of terrorism has been used to justify radical new legislation that gives police and intelligence agencies unprecedented powers to detain and question people believed to have information connected to terrorism. In this paper I explore the nature of the threat of non-state terrorism—threat to national security and the well-being of citizens. I argue th...
متن کاملThe Impact of Societal Risk Attitudes on Terrorism and Counterterrorism
We analyze decisions made by a group of terrorists and a target government in a zero-sum game in which the terrorists minimize, and the government maximizes, the expected utility of the median voter in the target country. The terrorists’ strategy balances the probability and the severity of the attack while the government chooses the level of investment reducing the probability and/or mitigatin...
متن کاملTerrorism Early Warning and Co-Production of Counterterrorism Intelligence
Contemporary terrorism is a complex phenomenon involving a range of non-state actors linked in networked organizations. These organizations, exemplified by the global jihadi movement known as al-Qaeda, are complex non-state actors operating as transnational networks within a galaxy of like-minded networks. These entities pose security threats to nation states and the collective global security....
متن کاملThe Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization
Many terrorist factions care about the level of popular support they enjoy within a population they claim to represent. Empirically, this level of support can either rise or fall in the aftermath of a campaign of terrorist violence. Under what circumstances is the use of terror an effective tactic for mobilizing political support for an extremist group? This article models a scenario in which a...
متن کاملOptimal Liability for Terrorism∗
This paper analyzes the appropriate normative role for civil liability in aligning terrorism precaution incentives when the perpetrators of terrorism are themselves beyond the jurisdiction of courts or regulators. We consider the strategic interaction among the targets, subsidiary victims, and terrorists within a sequential, game theoretic model. Analysis of the model reveals that, while an ‘op...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Revue économique
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0035-2764,1950-6694
DOI: 10.3917/reco.696.0961