منابع مشابه
Temptation and Self-Control†
In a two period decision problem, we study individuals who, in the second period, may be tempted by ex ante inferior choices. Individuals have preferences over sets of alternatives that represent the feasible choices in the second period. Our axioms yield a representation that identifies the individual’s commitment ranking, her temptation ranking, and her cost of selfcontrol. We provide an axio...
متن کاملTemptation, Self-Control, and Competitive Nonlinear Pricing
Standard pricing theories consider consumers without temptation. With temptation and costly self-control, consumers dislike choice sets with tempting alternatives. We study firms’ strategy against such consumers, using Gul–Pesendorfer preferences and a game where firms compete by offering menus. JEL Classification: D43, L13, L15
متن کاملTemptation and Self-Control: A Corrigendum
GP studied preferences over menus (sets) of alternatives. This implicitly means that the decision maker chooses a menu and then selects an alternative from the menu. Consider a compact metric space Z of prizes. Let ∆ be the set of all Borel probability measures over Z. An element in ∆ represents an alternative for (implicit) choice. Assume that ∆ is endowed with the topology of weak convergence...
متن کاملOn incentives, temptation and self-control
We consider a principal-agent model, where a single agent exhibits problems of self control modelled using Gul, Pesendorfer (2001) type temptation preferences. For a general class of preferences, yet specific family of temptation utilities, we characterize an optimal contract in such a setting using standard Grossman, Hart (1983) techniques. Firstly, our analysis shows that contrary to standard...
متن کاملTemptation and Self-Control as Duals1
Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [2008] attempt "[to identify] the broadest possible set of temptation-driven behavior." They argue that a desire for commitment characterizes such behavior. However, we argue that they go too far by including preferences which are not temptation-driven. We introduce two axioms which are stronger than their Desire for Commitment and weaker than Gul and Pesendorfers...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0012-9682,1468-0262
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00252