منابع مشابه
Policies in Relational Contracts
How should a firm set policies– public decision plans that determine the role of its employees, divisions, and suppliers– to strengthen its relationships? We explore whether and how a principal might bias the decisions she makes to foster relational contracts with her agents. To this end, we examine a flexible dynamic game between a principal and several agents with unrestricted vertical transf...
متن کاملInformation Revelation in Relational Contracts∗
This paper shows that the efficiency of relational contracting can be increased by reducing the public information through a novel intertemporalgarbling process of signals. A distinctive and essential feature of our intertemporalgarbling process is that past outputs have enduring effects on future signals. This process reduces the principal’s maximal reneging temptation by linking together the ...
متن کاملPolicy Commitments in Relational Contracts
How should an organization choose policies to strengthen its relationships with employees and partners? We explore how biased policies arise in relational contracts using a flexible dynamic game between a principal and several agents with unrestricted vertical transfers and symmetric information. If relationships are publicly observed, then optimal policies are never biased– they are always cho...
متن کاملInformation and Relational Contracts
We investigate the use of information in repeated principal-agent game and report three results. First, consistent with Kandori (1992), garbling signals within each period hurts the e¢ ciency of the game. Second, contrary to Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991), bundling signals across periods and then fully revealing them never increases the e¢ ciency of the game. Third, and most importantly, we ...
متن کاملRelational Incentive Contracts
Standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced. This paper studies the design of self-enforced relational contracts. I show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form, but that self-enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision. With hidden informa...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2886371