Team Semantics for Interventionist Counterfactuals: Observations vs. Interventions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Expressible Semantics for Expressible Counterfactuals
Lewis (1981) showed the equivalence between two dominant semantic frameworks for counterfactuals: ordering semantics, which relies on orders between possible worlds, and premise semantics, which relies on sets of propositions (so-called ordering sources). I define a natural, restricted version of premise semantics, expressible premise semantics, which is based on ordering sources containing onl...
متن کاملA Probabilistic Semantics for Counterfactuals. Part A
This is part A of a paper in which we defend a semantics for counterfactuals which is probabilistic in the sense that the truth condition for counterfactuals refers to a probability measure. Because of its probabilistic nature, it allows a counterfactual ‘if A then B’ to be true even in the presence of relevant ‘A and not B’-worlds, as long such exceptions are not too widely spread. The semanti...
متن کاملA Probabilistic Semantics for Counterfactuals. Part B
This is part B of a paper in which we defend a semantics for counterfactuals which is probabilistic in the sense that the truth condition for counterfactuals refers to a probability measure. Because of its probabilistic nature, it allows a counterfactual ‘if A then B’ to be true even in the presence of relevant ‘A and not B’-worlds, as long such exceptions are not too widely spread. The semanti...
متن کاملMany-Valued Semantics for Vague Counterfactuals
This paper is an attempt to provide a formal semantics to counterfactual propositions that involve vague sentences as their antecedent or consequent. The initial work on counterfactuals, due to Lewis ([8]), was based on Classical Logic and thus it focused on crisp sentences. Lewis proposed a semantics based on the notion of possible worlds that captures alternative ways a world could be, includ...
متن کاملFiltering semantics for counterfactuals: Bridging causal models
I argue that classical counterfactual semantics in the style of Stalnaker, Lewis, and Kratzer validates an inference pattern that is disconfirmed in natural language. The solution is to alter the algorithm we use to handle inconsistency in premise sets: rather than checking all maximally consistent fragments of a premise sets, as in Krazter’s semantics, we selectively remove some of the premise...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Philosophical Logic
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0022-3611,1573-0433
DOI: 10.1007/s10992-020-09573-6