TAXES AND SPENDING UNDER GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: National Tax Journal

سال: 1990

ISSN: 0028-0283,1944-7477

DOI: 10.1086/ntj41788842