Tax Information Exchange Influence on Czech Based Companies' Behavior in Relation to Tax Havens

Tax competition with parasitic tax havens

⁎ Corresponding author. Stephen M. Ross School of Bu 701 Tappan Street, Rm. R5396, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1 936 3914; fax: +734 936 8716. E-mail address: [email protected] (J. Slemrod). 1 The OECD report distinguished tax havens from significant revenues from the income tax but have prefe kinds of income, generally restricted to non-residents; about the kind of tax haven covered by the OECD's def...

Honor among Tax Havens

This note presents a simple, partial equilibrium model of the supply of offshore tax havens, when multinationals are capable of sheltering some of their worldwide income. It provides a few contrasting predictions to those in “Tax Competition with Parasitic Tax Havens” by Slemrod and Wilson. Slemrod and Wilson model tax sheltering as a production process which uses up scarce resources in the tax...

Tax Enforcement and Tax Havens under Formula Apportionment

In this paper, we consider optimal tax enforcement policy in the presence of pro…t shifting towards tax havens. We show that, under separate accounting, tax enforcement levels may be too high due to negative …scal externalities. In contrast, under formula apportionment, tax enforcement is likely to be too low due to positive externalities of tax enforcement. Our results challenge recent contrib...

Organizational Structure , Tax Havens , Analyst Forecast Properties and Information Environment

Do tax havens divert economic activity ? B

When multinational firms expand their operations in tax havens, do they divert activity from non-havens? Much of the debate on tax competition presumes that the answer to this question is yes. This paper offers a model for examining the relationship between activity in havens and non-havens, and discusses the implications of recent evidence in light of that model. Properly interpreted, the evid...